Adds an experimental power-cap mode using the undocumented RM ioctl
interface (based on panchovix's LACT PR #1205) to set power limits
below the VBIOS minimum (down to 30 W).
- hal/rm_power.py: RM ioctl power-cap read/write/reset + runtime probe
- limits.py: power_cap_mode (nvml/ioctl) with support detection
- config.py: persist power_cap_mode per GPU
- profiles: record/apply power_cap_mode
- server.py: POST /api/limits validates ioctl support (409 on failure)
- cli.py: profile save falls back to persisted mode
- client.py: power_cap_mode in Limits
- frontend: toggle + warning with panchovix attribution (LACT #1205)
- tests: test_rm_power.py (unit) + integration coverage
- Makefile: add test_rm_power.py to make test
Also includes automated linter reformatting (prettier, ruff, shellcheck,
isort, markdownlint) that the linter would apply anyway.
Security review findings, fixed and verified:
Critical
- Fix unauthenticated arbitrary file read: the SPA catch-all route
joined the raw URL path onto the dist dir without containment, so
encoded '..' segments (/%2e%2e/etc/passwd) leaked any file readable
by the root server. Resolve with realpath and reject paths outside
the dist dir (fail-closed 404).
High
- Daemon socket: serve_start no longer accepts caller-chosen
host/port. The socket is world-connectable (unprivileged CLI users),
so callers could previously rebind the root web server to 0.0.0.0.
The daemon now always binds the operator-configured address and
reports it in the response; the CLI warns on mismatch.
Medium
- Remove the per-request max_delta_khz override from the API: the
server-enforced safety cap is now authoritative. CLI direct paths
(write, profile apply, verify) honor the configured cap; --max-delta
still overrides for explicit root use.
- Snapshot restore: confine filepath to the snapshot directory
(realpath containment; blocks symlink escapes).
- Login lockout: honor X-Forwarded-For only for peers listed in the
new trusted_proxies config (rightmost untrusted hop), so the
per-IP lockout works behind a reverse proxy. Spoofed headers from
untrusted peers are ignored.
- /api/shutdown: new allow_api_shutdown config (default true);
shared systems can disable the API shutdown path.
TLS (opt-in, like auth)
- New ssl_certfile/ssl_keyfile config + CLI flags (serve start,
service install/configure, --no-ssl to disable). When active:
HTTPS for UI/API, wss:// for WebSockets, Secure session cookie,
CLI auto-switches to https://. Cert/key paths are validated up
front with a clear error instead of a silent uvicorn crash.
Tests & docs
- tests/test_security.py: standalone regression tests (no new deps)
covering SPA containment, snapshot containment, cap removal,
client-IP derivation, proxy normalization, TLS scheme detection,
and daemon host/port hardening.
- README + Usage-Guide: TLS section, new config keys, updated
security notes.
Add optional login protection for the web UI/API, intended for shared
machines (e.g. AI servers). Dual mode: with no users configured the API
and web UI are open (as before); once at least one user exists, every
/api/* and /ws/* endpoint requires a valid session.
- bcrypt password hashing: passwords stored as $2b$ hashes in
/etc/nvcurve/users.json (0600, root-owned); plaintext never persisted.
- 24-hour sessions: HttpOnly cookie for browsers, Authorization: Bearer
token for CLI/scripts; in-memory, invalidated on server restart.
- Multi-user: multiple named accounts (no shared-password mode).
- New CLI: nvcurve user add|list|remove|set-password (root for mutating
ops; password always prompted, never a CLI argument).
- New endpoints: GET /api/ping (public), /api/auth/status|login|logout|users.
- Web UI: sign-in screen when auth is enabled; status bar shows the
signed-in user with sign-out; expired sessions (401) re-show sign-in.
- Brute-force lockout: 10 failed logins/IP within 5 min -> 15 min lockout.
- New dependency: bcrypt.
Also: LSP config (pyrightconfig.json) pointing at the project .venv, and
small error-handling cleanups in daemon.py/server.py.
ARIA