Security review findings, fixed and verified:
Critical
- Fix unauthenticated arbitrary file read: the SPA catch-all route
joined the raw URL path onto the dist dir without containment, so
encoded '..' segments (/%2e%2e/etc/passwd) leaked any file readable
by the root server. Resolve with realpath and reject paths outside
the dist dir (fail-closed 404).
High
- Daemon socket: serve_start no longer accepts caller-chosen
host/port. The socket is world-connectable (unprivileged CLI users),
so callers could previously rebind the root web server to 0.0.0.0.
The daemon now always binds the operator-configured address and
reports it in the response; the CLI warns on mismatch.
Medium
- Remove the per-request max_delta_khz override from the API: the
server-enforced safety cap is now authoritative. CLI direct paths
(write, profile apply, verify) honor the configured cap; --max-delta
still overrides for explicit root use.
- Snapshot restore: confine filepath to the snapshot directory
(realpath containment; blocks symlink escapes).
- Login lockout: honor X-Forwarded-For only for peers listed in the
new trusted_proxies config (rightmost untrusted hop), so the
per-IP lockout works behind a reverse proxy. Spoofed headers from
untrusted peers are ignored.
- /api/shutdown: new allow_api_shutdown config (default true);
shared systems can disable the API shutdown path.
TLS (opt-in, like auth)
- New ssl_certfile/ssl_keyfile config + CLI flags (serve start,
service install/configure, --no-ssl to disable). When active:
HTTPS for UI/API, wss:// for WebSockets, Secure session cookie,
CLI auto-switches to https://. Cert/key paths are validated up
front with a clear error instead of a silent uvicorn crash.
Tests & docs
- tests/test_security.py: standalone regression tests (no new deps)
covering SPA containment, snapshot containment, cap removal,
client-IP derivation, proxy normalization, TLS scheme detection,
and daemon host/port hardening.
- README + Usage-Guide: TLS section, new config keys, updated
security notes.
