docs/09 §9.4 promised a SSH-host-key-style fingerprint confirm on first
pair, but the app built a default OkHttpClient with no certificate
handling — self-signed gateway certs were simply rejected.
Build the flow:
- TlsPinning.kt: PinningTrustManager wraps the platform default trust
manager; a rejected cert is accepted only when its SHA-256 fingerprint
matches the user-confirmed pin, anything else fails with
TlsFingerprintRequired (hostname verification still applies).
- SecureStore.pinnedCertFingerprint (Android EncryptedSharedPreferences +
desktop settings.json), cleared on forget().
- GatewayClient: pinning socket factory on the shared client (all legs
inherit it), new terminal State.TlsConfirmRequired, unwrap the nested
TlsFingerprintRequired in connect loop / watchdog / SSE / poll /
testHello.
- ConnectScreen: confirm dialog showing the fingerprint ("Confirm &
pin" re-runs the connect); IrisApp routes TlsConfirmRequired there;
ChatScreen + desktop tray handle the new state.
- Docs: §9.4 now describes the real flow (incl. SAN requirement), gap
table item 6 → implemented, setup.md limitation note updated.
- Tests: TlsPinningTest (fingerprint vs openssl, pin accept/reject,
live pin read, unwrap) + TlsPinningIntegrationTest (real TLS
handshake: unpinned → confirm data, pinned → 200).
Live E2E verified on the phone: first pair against a self-signed
IRIS_HTTP_CERT gateway shows the dialog, confirm pins, chat works,
auto-reconnect after gateway restart uses the pin.
Auth previously used the shared IRIS_TOKEN as the security principal:
a leaked token meant access to all devices, and a compromised device
could not be isolated.
Gateway:
- pairing.py: devices.token column (in-place migration) + revoked
denylist table; issue_token (idempotent, 64 hex), token_for,
reissue_token, revoke/unrevoke/is_revoked/list_revoked. The token
never leaks into device dicts (push fan-out / listings).
- http_server.py: auth accepts the shared token (bootstrap/legacy) OR
the device's own token (both constant-time); a revoked device_id is
rejected with 401 before either comparison. On SSE open (pairing)
the per-device token is minted and returned in hello.ack.
- protocol.py: hello_ack(..., device_token).
- adapter.py: setup flow (hermes gateway setup -> Iris) now offers
'Remove a paired device?' on an existing setup: numbered select
menu (last option = exit the removal loop), confirmation, back to
the menu for further removals.
- tools/iris_devices.py: operator CLI (list / revoke / unrevoke /
reissue), stdlib only.
App:
- SecureStore.deviceToken (Android: EncryptedSharedPreferences;
Desktop: second keyring slot iris-device-token / device_token.enc).
- HelloAckPayload.deviceToken; GatewayClient stores it on hello and
presents it instead of the shared token from then on (live provider
in HttpGateway); savePairing/clear wipe it for re-pairing.
Docs: 09 §9.3 stretch -> implemented (revocation semantics, both
control surfaces), 04 hello.ack example, frames.schema.json, M7 row 13.
Tests: 8 new Python tests (issuance, acceptance, revocation,
isolation, unrevoke, registry unit x2, setup-flow menu) - 94/94 pass;
2 new Kotlin wire tests - green. Live-verified against a running
gateway (hello.ack token matches devices.db; revoke -> 401 even with
shared token; unrevoke -> 200; setup TUI both paths).
- e2e.py: scenario 13 (http fallback) — drives a full turn over the
HTTP leg (health + POST /v1/frame + SSE /v1/events, no WS) and
asserts the user echo lands on the SSE stream in < 1.5 s.
- ws_probe.py --http: prints '== user echo in X.XXs' (the docs/19
sendable-in-fallback timing assertion) alongside the existing
health/POST/SSE output; same assertion flags as the WS leg.
- docs: 19 status flipped to implemented; 09-pairing-security §9.4
cross-reference (second door, same lock: token + device allowlist,
64 KiB cap, rate limit, optional TLS, unauthenticated /v1/health);
13-testing manual scenario 15 + automated pointers.
ARIA